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1. Introduction 
 
If we conceptualize groups which act intentionally as agents in their own right, then when they 
speak, whatever the mechanism, they do so with the sorts of intentions, beliefs, and desires 
characteristic of individual agents. There is nothing special or distinctive about group speech 
acts in this sense. They are individual speech acts. There is nothing special to investigate, no 
additional territory in speech act theory to be explored. The topic of group speech acts 
becomes interesting when we reject the individual agent model of the group agent and 
conceptualize the group’s acting as a matter of the individual agents who are members of it 
acting in concert with each other to do something that is analogous to, but not the same as, 
what individuals do when they speak. I am interested in group speech acts in the latter sense. 
What kinds of group speech act are there? What is their structure and point? How do they 
express the agency of their members?  
 
In section 2, I give a brief taxonomy of Group Speech Acts, distinguishing Collective Speech Acts 
(e.g., singing “Happy Birthday”, or two people agreeing to meet for lunch) from Group Proxy 
Speech Acts (e.g., Volkswagen announcing through a spokesperson a recall of its 2018 Polo 
model). In section 3, I give a brief overview of Collective Speech Acts. In section 4, I provide an 
extended analysis of Group Proxy Speech Acts. The key concept is that of a proxy agent who 
represents a group. I explain this in terms of the concept of a status role, which is explained as a 
special type of status function which attaches to an agent and requires the possessor to 
exercise her agency to fulfill the function so assigned. Status functions are explained in terms of 
constitutive rules and a species of convention that involves a group jointly intentionally solving 
a coordination problem. Section 5 reviews complications and objections.  Section 6 is a brief 
summary. 
 
2. A Taxonomy of Group Speech Acts 
 
Group speech acts divide into (a) collective speech acts in which all members participate at the 
time of the speech act and (b) group speech acts performed through proxies, such as a 
spokesperson, or a similar mechanism, e.g., a press release, or posting a notice on a board or 
web site. (a) Collective speech acts can be divided further into (i) those that are irreducibly 
collective, such as agreements and (ii) those that collectivize individual speech acts, for 
example, collective applause. The basic divisions are represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Types of Group Speech Act. The main division of Group Speech Acts is between collective 
speech acts in which all participate and group proxy speech acts in which a proxy performs the 
utterance act for the group. Collective speech acts divide into collectivized versions of individual 
speech acts like a welcome song or singing Happy Birthday and irreducibly collective speech acts like 
agreeing to meet for lunch or shaking hands as a form of greeting in which the group level is the 
primary level at which the speech act occurs. 
 
3. Collective Speech Acts 
 
3.1 Irreducibly Collective Speech Acts1 
 
I discuss briefly agreements, voting, and mutual greetings as paradigmatic examples, and 
suggest that some familiar speech acts may usefully be reconceptualized as contributions to 
joint speech acts.  
 
Agreements 
 
Speech acts are contributions, in the conceptually central case, to communicative exchanges. A 
well-studied category of speech act verb identifies a contribution by a speaker to a 
communicative exchange. These includes: assert, command, order, suggest, report, explain, 
inquire, ask, demand, insist, christen, exclaim, congratulate, apologize, thank and so on. 
 
1 (Hancher, 1979) seems to have been the first to draw explicit attention to irreducibly collective speech 
acts—cooperative illocutionary acts in his terminology—though there are hints in Austin (1962), as Hancher notes.  
Hancher reserves collective speech act for what I am calling collectivized individual speech acts, and multiple 
speech acts for aggregations of speech acts that are not performed by the individuals with the intention of doing 
anything with others.  The trouble with reserving ‘cooperative’ for irreducibly collective speech acts is that 
collectivized individual speech acts are constitutively cooperative as well.   
GURXS SSeech AcWV
(b) GURXS PUR[\ SSeech AcWV(a) CROOecWiYe SSeech AcWV
(ii) CROOecWiYi]ed IQdiYidXaO
SSeech AcWV
(i) IUUedXcibO\ CROOecWiYe
SSeech AcWV
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Another, less often noticed, class of speech act verbs, however, pick out actions accomplishing 
something in distinctively linguistic in communicative exchanges which go beyond the 
contribution of a single participant. A paradigmatic example is the speech act verb agree, which 
signals a public act by two or more agents, rather than accordance in belief or feeling.2 The 
latter sense is at issue when I agree with what you think about Jackson Pollock but never 
mention it to you or otherwise speak about it. In contrast, if we agree to meet for lunch 
tomorrow, a public transaction occurs between us to which we each contribute, but which is 
not a matter of agreement of belief or sentiment—not even the belief that we will meet for 
lunch, for I may agree insincerely. An agreement in this sense picks out a kind of speech act to 
which at least two people must make contributions for it to occur.3 Thus, it is a group speech 
act. There is nothing like it that an individual speaker can do. It takes two to tango: It takes two 
or more to agree. Agreement is the generic term. We have many terms for more specific sorts 
of agreements: contracts, compacts, bets, treaties, blood oaths, pacts, conventions, covenants, 
truces, and so on.  
 
Why call an agreement in this sense itself a speech act? Why isn’t agreement, like conversation, 
just a term for two or more individual speech acts of a certain sort? I propose: Let’s meet for 
lunch tomorrow. You respond: Sounds good. Each of us performs an individual speech act: 
agreeing to meet for lunch. But that is not all that has happened. And we miss even what each 
has done if we don’t see what we are aiming to do together. We have not only each agreed to 
something. We have together made an agreement. I am agreeing with you to do something. It 
is like, though not exactly like, a mutual promise, for neither of us is committed to anything 
unless we both agree.4 It has an illocutionary point, which is to bind us together to meeting for 
lunch tomorrow, not just each independently. It has a direction of fit, world to mind. It has 
satisfaction conditions: we must meet jointly intentionally tomorrow for lunch in virtue of 
having agreed to do so. Its upshot, if sincere, is that we share an intention to realize our 
 
2 Justin Hughes drew my attention to this as an important and distinctive category of group speech acts in a paper 
on multilateral treaties delivered at a workshop on Group Speech Acts at the University of Vienna in August 2016.   
3 That agreements are joint actions is urged in (Sheinman, 2011);  (Gilbert, 1993) characterizes them as joint 
decisions.  
4 As (Gilbert, 1993) notes, a mutual promise involves each party independently binding himself to do something, 
but in an agreement, neither is bound independently of the other’s contribution to the agreement, and when one 
breaks the agreement (without an excuse) the other is relieved of any obligation under it.  Neither of these is true 
of mutual promising.  Could agreements be construed as mutual conditional promises: I promise to do my part, if 
you do (or promise conditionally to do) yours?  No, because when the condition is the doing, no obligation is 
present before the performance but in agreement there is obligation from the outset; and if the condition is the 
promising, still each has an obligation if both conditionally promise, regardless of whether the other carries 
through (see Gilbert 1993 pp. 237-241 for further discussion).  (Sheinman, 2011), contra Gilbert, argues that 
agreements can be constructed out of promises, but does not argue that it meets all of Gilbert’s desiderata.  In 
particular, he denies that one is no longer obligated to do one’s part if the other defaults.  But surely if we agree 
that you will deliver goods and I wilI pay you, but you default, I am no longer under any obligation to pay you, and I 
am not guilty of violating the agreement if I do not; similarly, if you deliver and I don’t pay, you are not obligated to 
leave the goods with me, as Sheinman’s account entails.  Agreements are their own kind of thing: by a pair of 
public acts, we place ourselves under a mutual obligation to carry out a joint action plan, where the nature of the 
obligation is such that it binds either only if each at least strives to carry out his or her part.  As I suggest below that 
even if agreements are not made out of promises, promising may itself be conceptualized as a joint speech act.  
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agreement. It is not enough that each intends himself to go to the meeting place expecting the 
other to be there. It requires we-intentions, not I-intentions. We-intentions are the sort of 
intentions individuals have when participating in joint intentional action (walking with 
someone, or playing tennis) as opposed to doing something by oneself (brushing your teeth or 
playing solitaire).5 Thus, it is a speech act. But it is not an individual speech act.  
 
Joint Decision Procedures 
 
Once we see the potential, it is easy to recognize other irreducibly collective speech acts 
performed by multiple agents acting in concert. Joint decision procedures provide a rich vein. 
When a roll call vote is performed in a committee, each member votes ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In so doing, 
they are jointly deciding, and at the same time declaring, what their joint position is. Insofar as 
it issues in a joint commitment, it is also a kind of agreement, except that in pure cases 
everyone signals acceptance as his or her part. In a decision procedure that allows dissent, the 
contributions need not all be signals of acceptance. But all parties accept the procedure and so 
are conditionally committed to abiding by its outcome. The particular kind of speech act 
involved has two dimensions. One is given by its being a decision procedure which aggregates 
individual votes and yields a result that the voters are committed to accepting. The other is 
given by the content of the decision. A group may by a majority vote make a promise to do 
something. A panel of judges by a majority vote may make a ruling. A country’s voters by a 
majority of vote may appoint a new chief executive.6 In this we can see a theoretical basis for 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment that voting is a form of speech protected under the First 
Amendment. 
 
Agreements and group decision procedures that poll opinion or judgment are constitutively 
expressions of collective agency and are intended to be public in the relevant group. They meet 
the requirement of overtness of communicative intention (Jankovic, 2014).7  The first 
consumers of the speech act are the members of the group that produces it. In many cases 
there are others toward whom communicative intent is directed. The vote by a panel of judges 
results in a ruling which is directed primarily at the parties to the case and secondarily to the 
encompassing legal system. Joint decision procedures are often directed at determining 
policies, rules, goals, and so on for institutions, and their announcements often count as 
announcements by the institution itself. In this joint decisions procedures are combined with 
 
5 The term ‘we-intention’ was introduced by (Tuomela and Miller, 1988). A variety of analyses have been offered 
(Bratman, 1992, 1999, 2014; Gilbert, 2013; Ludwig, 2007, 2016; Miller, 2001; Tuomela, 2005, 2013). The 
differences in detail won’t matter for present purposes.  
6 Not all joint decision procedures are group speech acts. For example, deciding by drawing straws or flipping a 
coin, playing rock-paper-scissors, or ritual combat, are not speech acts. The first two make the decision depend on 
chance from the point of view of the group, so it is not something they do. The second two make it depend on a 
competition. But winning is something only one of them does.  
7 For secret ballots, vote count is still made public or the procedure fails its function. Each person’s voting is an act 
of the same character except for it not being associable with an individual. Each vote is communicated to someone 
who counts them. Similarly, a message found in a bottle on the beach is still an act of communication even if the 
person reading it does not know (in any interesting sense) who sent it. Even in this case, there is nothing hidden 
about the content of the communicative intention, only whose intention it is.  
 6 
group proxy speech acts and often involve declarative speech acts (Hancher, 1979; Searle, 
1979).  
 
Greetings 
 
When we shift to the collective perspective on speech acts, we find many familiar phenomena 
looking like collective speech acts. For example, greetings (and leave takings) look very much 
like agreements in being joint actions. There is something that each individual does, as in 
agreements, but they contribute by design to something that they do together. This is clear in 
patterns like shaking hands (which can also be the consummation of an agreement), fist bumps, 
hugs, kissing each other’s cheek, or saluting in which one party is to salute first and the other to 
return the salute. The right level of description of the activity is at the group level. This is 
something they are doing together intentionally. It is a kind of mutual acknowledgement of 
their each recognizing the other as having a certain standing, the exact character of which can 
vary with the style of greeting (saying ‘Hi’ as opposed to saluting) and context. It is intended to 
be public among them. It is consumed by the participants, like an agreement. The participants 
are conceptualized as making similar contributions to what they do together.  
 
The case of verbal greeting or saluting is an instance of a call and response pattern. A call and 
response pattern is a joint intentional action in which one agent initiates a linguistic exchange 
(understood to include any public acts intended to contribute to the exchange, not just 
verbalizations) and the other, in virtue of the form of the first, is to respond in a particular way 
or select a response from a determinate range of sorts of responses. The call and response 
pattern is by its nature a collective intentional action. When it has a distinctive communicative 
point, it constitutes an irreducibly collective speech act.  
 
Reconceptualizing familiar cases 
 
Many familiar interchanges can be seen as instances of the call and response pattern. Marriage 
ceremonies are frequently call and response patterns, with a judge or religious figure calling for 
each of the parties to the marriage to repeat vows, and to accept the marriage, and then 
completing the pattern by proclaiming them married.8 This should be reconceptualized as a 
joint speech act. It is both a call and response pattern and a kind of supervised contracting with 
one another and the community. Even an individual promising to do something takes on a 
different look when viewed from this perspective, because while the promisee is not called on 
to respond, the promisee has the option of declining to accept that the promiser is under an 
obligation to him. Since this is understood by both parties, the promisee’s not explicitly 
declining to accept the promisor’s binding himself to her constitutes accepting the promisor’s 
 
8 (Hancher, 1979) rightly characterizes it as a bilateral contract and notes that the official administering the 
marriage contract to the couple merely announces ex post facto their having entered into the state of marriage by 
their exchange of vows.  In fact, “I now pronounce you man and wife” in the traditional ceremony is not a 
declarative in Searle’s sense because what it expresses has already been achieved.  
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offer to be bound to her to do what is promised.9 Thus, even what has long been seen as a 
paradigmatic individual speech act on a closer look appears to be a component of a collective 
speech act.10  
 
3.2 Collectivized Individual Speech Acts 
 
Collectivized individual speech acts are individual speech acts types that groups perform as a 
group. A simple example is a group singing a welcome song. Often the lyrics make clear that it is 
expressing the group sentiment in the use of the first person plural pronoun. Some welcoming 
songs have a call and response pattern, for example, the African song and dance Funga Alafia—
often sung as a call, ‘Funga Alafia’ (Welcome, blessings), and response ‘Ashay, Ashay’ (Let it be 
so)). Call and response is a common form for group expressive acts. Call and response chants or 
songs have an expressive role in laments, protests (e.g. ‘Hell You Talmbout’), cheer leading 
(‘Give me an “M”’, ‘M’, ‘Give me an “I”’, ‘I’, etc.), prayer (in the liturgy of the Catholic Mass, in 
the eucharist), and so on. The importance of the call and response pattern, and a plausible 
reason it is found so often in group expressive speech acts, is that it makes fully explicit in the 
coordinated roles that it is a group expressive speech act rather than just the aggregate of its 
members individual speech acts.  
 
The type of speech act is similar to that in the individual case. The subject differs in being the 
group and the utterance act is the sum of the utterance acts of the individuals involved. That 
the group is its subject doesn’t mean that the group is an agent in its own right. Rather, the 
members of the group share an intention to represent themselves as all together being 
committed as members of the group to (for example) welcoming someone. Sharing an 
intention is a matter of each member of the group having a we-intention, an intention to do her 
part in their shared plan, and perhaps having certain beliefs about the conditions for success.11 
Similarly, an individual or a group can sing “Happy Birthday”, sign a get well soon or thank you 
card, congratulate someone, etc. When the group does it as a group what makes it a group 
speech act is their doing it with the intention to do it as a group, that is, their doing it with a 
shared intention in the sense just indicated. A group of people individually singing “Happy 
Birthday” to someone at the same time, though the product is indistinguishable, are not jointly 
wishing the recipient Happy Birthday but only individually.  
 
 
9 Hancher (1979) classifies offers as precooperative illocutionary acts, in part because offers can occur whether or 
not accepted.  A promise is akin to an offer to put oneself under an obligation to the promissee.  But promising, in 
contrast to offering, requires that the promissee accept one’s offer.  Thus, ‘promise’ picks out a joint act rather 
than an individual one.  I here assume that if one promised, one did succeed in placing oneself under an obligation, 
that is, that the intent was successful.  If this is right, then the intent is directed toward implementing a joint action 
plan in which one offers and the other accepts. 
10 In fact, Gilbert (1993, pp. 648-9) makes the suggestion that promises are like agreements except that they result 
in only one person being bound by it rather than two.   
11 See note 5 for a list of accounts of shared intention and we-intentions. For present purposes what matters is 
that shared intention resolves into a network of interlocking attitudes of individual agents, a feature shared by 
most accounts.  
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The illocutionary profile of group expressive speech acts is similar to the individual case, but not 
the same. The differences have to do with the translation to the group context. As for the 
individual case, there is no direction of fit. But the point is to express a shared group emotion or 
attitude as opposed to just an individual one. The sincerity condition is the possession of the 
shared emotion or attitude. As in the individual case, they often have a target in the sense of a 
propositional content which is the focus of the emotion or attitude, e.g., someone’s joining a 
group, having a birthday, or winning a race. So the collectivized individual speech act and the 
individual speech act it is modeled on are distinct species of the same genus.  
 
The precise nature of shared group emotion is a matter for further analysis. It is not merely a 
matter of each member having the relevant attitude. The group that sings “Happy Birthday” not 
together but in parallel all have the attitude, but they are not sharing it. Plausibly, it is sufficient 
for their sharing it that they each have it and intend to express it in concert with the other 
members of the group. However, in general sharing an emotion will not require the intention to 
express it because sharing the emotion typically plays a role in the group coming to intend to 
express it. Sharing an emotion (or an attitude) among a group in the relevant sense in general 
will plausibly involve it being public among them that all (or most of them) have it, and their 
identifying as a group member.12  
 
Virtually any individual speech act may collectivized. Examples are applause after a lecture or a 
performance as expressions of thanks or appreciation, campaign staffers cheering their 
candidate when she wins an elections as an expression of congratulations, parents assuring 
their children they will see them the through college as a joint promise, protesters chanting 
“Protect Kids, Not Guns,” as a joint directive, or singing “We will shall overcome” to jointly state 
what they will do to express their determination and commitment, or the UN Declaration on 
Human Rights as a joint declarative. In all of these cases, the illocutionary point is the same 
genus as for individual speech acts. It is adjusted for the subject and the sincerity condition is 
the sharing of the attitude that is the sincerity condition in the individual case (except the 
institutional cases which introduce complications taken up in the next section). 
 
It is a hallmark of collectivized individual speech acts that all members of the group participate 
directly in producing the speech act. I am not a member of the group that sings “Happy 
Birthday” if I am not singing it. I am not a member of the group that expresses appreciation by 
applauding after a performance if I am not applauding. I am not a member of the group that 
urges us to “Protect Kids, Not Guns” if I am silent while they chant (though I may be among the 
protesters on the street that day).  
 
12 Do all members of a group need to have the relevant attitude or emotion?  Suppose one person singing ‘Happy 
Birthday’ with others in fact wishes its recipient would drop dead, but dare not say so.  Is the group then insincere 
in wishing her happy birthday?  This would certainly be misleading!  What if half are not sincere?  Is the group 
insincere?  This might also be misleading, though it would be equally misleading to say that they were sincere.  
Rather than insist on a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer it would be better to allow degrees of sincerity (and insincerity), with 
highest degree requiring that everyone in the group performing the collective speech act share the relevant 
attitude.  At the other end is not merely everyone lacking the relevant attitude but it being common knowledge 
among them that they do.  My thanks to an anonymous referee for the prompt for this footnote.  
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For larger groups, collectivizing speech acts in this way is often unwieldly or impractical. One 
way to make provision for speech acts by groups in these cases is to appeal to a group 
representative or proxy who serves as a mouthpiece for the group, namely, a spokesperson. 
Once the device in available, it turns out to be an effective method for institutional speech acts. 
Its use by institutions introduces additional complications into our understanding of the type of 
group speech act performed, however. We take this up in detail in the next section.  
 
4. Group Proxy Speech Acts 
 
The paradigmatic mechanism for this type of group speech act is the spokesperson.13 The 
spokesperson is a proxy agent who is authorized to speak on the group’s behalf and in its name. 
The spokesperson’s individual speech acts in her role as spokesperson express her principal’s 
position. The spokesperson is a device that can also be used by an individual, and so it is not 
peculiar to group speech acts. But it provides a convenient mechanism by which a group can 
represent itself as doing something analogous to an individual speech act. It is particularly 
prominent in institutional speech. Related mechanisms for group speech acts are press 
releases, web site postings, social media, posting policies on a bulletin board in a hallway, etc. 
These cases also involve authorized agents directing or making the postings or announcements 
with authorization, though they typically remain behind the scenes. Though the spokesperson 
role can in principle be fulfilled by a group, I will concentrate on the case of the individual 
spokesperson. This is a kind of group speech act which aims to fulfill a function for the group 
similar to the function of an individual speech act. In this category we find many of the usual 
speech act verbs applied to groups: assert, order, thank, apologize, congratulate, announce, 
explain, and so on.  
 
I concentrate on the case of the spokesperson. Other mechanisms are similar enough to see 
how the account can be extended. The device of the spokesperson raises a number of 
questions for speech act theory. How can what one person says count as a group’s announcing, 
or reporting, or asking something? What exactly is nature of the speech act performed that we 
subsume under the same speech act verbs as individual speech acts? Is it the same or different 
despite the use of the same word in reporting it? What are the sincerity conditions for proxy 
group speech acts? Does the spokesperson perform a speech act in her own right, and if so, 
what is its relation to what the group does through her agency?  
 
 
13 An important pioneering paper is (Hughes, 1984), who appeals to a group illocutionary intention in the light of 
which a member speaks. In contrast to my account below, he does not require the member be authorized to speak 
on the group’s behalf, but only that the group not object. However, this fails to respect the distinction between 
speaking in the interests of a group, on the one hand, and as a representative of a it, on the other. Other related 
discussions are (Tollefsen, 2007) and (Fricker, 2012) on learning from group testimony, and Lackey (2017), which 
contains a criticism of my account, to which I respond below, as well as criticisms of Tollefsen and Fricker.  
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4.1 Overview 
 
I give my general, somewhat idealized, picture at the outset, then work through the details, and 
consider complications. I take the case of group announcement as my example. The main 
elements of the view are the following, with key ideas expressed in boldface. 
 
1. The spokesperson is a proxy agent of the group (which is a certain kind of status role),  
2. authorized to act in the group’s name (chosen for the role by an intragroup decision 
procedure),  
3. so that when the spokesperson acts in her role as spokesperson, conveying a message 
authorized by the group,  
4. her utterance act (in turn) has a status function in a social transaction with the group’s 
audience (that is, in a collective intentional action in which the group and its audience 
have their roles to play and which requires them to coordinate on the same thing as 
playing the role of group announcement in the transaction, and so to adopt a 
convention between them) 
5. which is to serve as the expression of a content to which the group which thereby acts is 
committed (to its audience and sometimes others) to acting in accord with (as realized 
in their conditional we-intentions if sincere) insofar as they act as the group that 
appointed the spokesperson (in their roles as members of that group organized for 
action in relation to which the spokesperson was appointed).  
 
I begin by explaining how I am understanding the notion of proxy agent (Ludwig, 2014, 2017). 
To do this I must explain the concept of a status role since a proxy agent is a someone with a 
particular sort of status role. A status role is in turn a special type status function, but to explain 
a status function I must first discuss constitutive rules because constitutive rules for collective 
intentional action types define the status functions which are attached to particular things or 
types of things for use in social transactions by a form of collective acceptance.  
 
4.2 Constitutive Rules 
 
Rules in a community are regulative when they govern a type of behavior that can exist 
independently of the rules being followed. Rules governing traffic, such as the rule that one is 
to drive on the right side of the road in Austria, or Robert’s Rules of Order (RRO), are regulative 
rules in this sense. You can drive on the left in Austria and still be driving, and you can hold a 
meeting without following RRO. Constitutive rules, as Searle put it in a classic discussion, “do 
not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior”; rules for games such as 
football or chess “create the very possibility of playing such games” (Searle 1969, p. 33). They 
are activities that “are constituted by acting in accordance with (at least a large subset of) the 
appropriate rules” and they “constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is 
logically dependent on the rules” (p. 34). When contrasted with regulative rules, constitutive 
rules can seem mysterious. What kind of rule is it the following of which brings into existence 
the type of behavior it governs? If it governs a behavior, doesn’t there have to be an 
independent characterization of the behavior it governs? 
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In following a constitutive rule, we represent an action type to which we intend to conform our 
behavior. For the rule to be constitutive of the action type, the action type must incorporate in 
its concept that it comes about as a result of the rule being followed. But there has to be an 
independent target. So the action type can be analyzed into at least two components. First, 
there is an activity pattern type that can be instantiated without being instantiated 
intentionally. Second, there is (at least) the additional requirement that it be instantiated 
intentionally. For example, there is a neutral description of the pattern of activity involving in 
playing chess or tic tac toe. When we add to that concept that it is instantiated intentionally 
with the goal of each to achieve a winning position, we have described the game of chess or tic-
tac-toe. The set of rules of chess or tic-tac-toe, specified in terms of player and piece roles (the 
player of the white pieces moves first, then players alternate moves, the pawn when first 
moved may be moved one or two places forward or diagonally forward on a square if an 
opposing piece occupies it, provided the player’s king is not in check, and so on), jointly specify 
an action type (by placing constraints on a pattern of activity involving any two agents for it to 
count as in accordance with them).  The pattern could be instantiated unintentionally or 
intentionally. The rules are constitutive of an action type though only insofar as it includes in its 
concept that it is the chess pattern and that it (or something near enough) is instantiated 
intentionally. Constitutive rules are then constitutive relative to an action type, and every 
regulative rule is constitutive relative to action types that require them to be followed 
intentionally. If we define a parliamentary meeting as one carried out in accordance with RRO, 
then RRO are constitutive rules for parliamentary meetings. Constitutive rules may be for 
individual or joint action. Our interest lies in the latter. In this case, the intentions of the 
participants are we-intentions directed toward their doing something together in accordance 
with a common plan. 
 
4.3 Status Functions and Status Roles 
 
Constitutive rules very often specify an action type in terms of the use of something in a certain 
role (not just the agent) without specifying what is to play that role. The concepts of pawn, 
bishop, knight, rook, king and queen in chess, for example, are role concepts: they are defined 
in terms of their initial positions, and then how they can be moved. A consequence is that if two 
people are to play chess, they are faced with a coordination problem. If they do not coordinate 
on the same objects for the same roles, then cannot succeed in their intention to play chess. 
Solving the coordination problem has to be something that they do together intentionally, since 
it is a precondition for their carrying out their intention to play chess. Their intentionally 
coordinating on the same objects amounts to their assigning status functions in Searle’s sense 
(1995) to certain objects. They can serve their functions in the social transaction only by the 
players collectively accepting them as having those roles. It is necessary and sufficient for this 
that their we-intentions directed toward their play have the same objects in the same roles.14 
No doubt they also believe or accept that they have those roles, but this would not be enough 
by itself if their we-intentions did not follow suit and it is not necessary.  
 
14 This cashes out collective acceptance differently from Searle; see (Ludwig, 2017). 
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Things can have also status functions when they are not being used, provided that an 
appropriate community of agents intends to use particular items or types of items in their roles 
when engaging in the relevant sorts of social transactions. In this case, they have generalized 
conditional we-intentions to engage with others in those sorts of transactions using those items 
or types of items. This constitutes a convention amongst them about what to use in the 
relevant roles to solve a recurring coordination problem (Jankovic and ludwig, 2018). There may 
be a convention to use one or another of some set of items in the roles, which ones being 
negotiated on the fly with those with whom one intends to engage in the relevant transactions.  
 
Status roles are a particular type of status function assigned to an agent. An agent might be 
assigned the role of the white king in chess. This is a status function, not a status role. In a 
status role an agent is expected to exercise her agency self-consciously and intentionally in the 
role as part of its function. I distinguish between patient status roles and agent status roles. The 
difference is that patient status roles are assigned without requiring the assignee’s buy-in, 
whereas agent status roles presuppose it. Being assigned the status of a defendant in a court 
case does not require the person so designated to accept the role, but it does conceive of the 
role as one in which the occupant has a role to play, with provision for what to do if the 
defendant does not play along. In contrast, the roles of goalie or judge or professor or student 
and so on are agent status roles that presuppose that their occupier has accepted the role, that 
is, that the occupier is a part of the group that collectively accepts that she has that role.15 
Henceforth, I’ll use status role as short of agent status role. 
 
4.4 Spokesperson as Proxy Agent 
 
A proxy agent generally is someone who has been authorized to act for someone or some 
group officially. An example of a proxy agent is someone who has been assigned a power of 
attorney, e.g., to sign closing papers on the sale of my house when I am out of the country. The 
proxy is assigned a status role, a function in a social transaction between seller and buyer, in 
this case, which requires her to exercise her agency, specifically, by signing certain papers, 
producing the power of attorney as required, and handling any issues that come up within her 
purview in the role. My proxy signing, with her authority, counts as my selling the house (given 
appropriate corresponding actions by the buyer). Thus, her signing is invested with the same 
significance as my signing. My signing is making my contribution to the legal contract. It has a 
status function in the transaction (the function is to signal formal consent to legal transfer of 
property). The signature of my proxy in virtue of her authority has the same status function 
when she acts under the authority of the power of attorney. The idea of acting officially for 
someone is the idea of acting under authority so that what one does has status functions in a 
 
15 This is not to say that the people who occupy these roles always intend to fulfill the associated functions. They 
may accept roles insincerely or change their minds. Many roles attach by convention or law to their occupiers once 
they have accepted them regardless of whether they intend to fulfill the role functions. This gives us a standard by 
which to judge their behavior in relation to the assigned role.  
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transaction involving not the proxy but the agent for whom she is a proxy. It is in this sense that 
she acts as a representative. 
 
My main thesis is that the spokesperson is an instance of this kind of representative. The 
spokesperson is a proxy agent also. The spokesperson has been authorized to act for another 
officially. The spokesperson in the same sense represents the person for whom she is a 
spokesperson. Her utterances acts in her role have a certain status function, a representative 
function, in relation to the group. How does this work?  
 
What is the function of group announcement? First, it has a point in relation to an audience. It 
is not an individual speech act, but it is to play a role analogous to that.16 In thinking about the 
point of group announcement, we can put aside the case of insincerity, because that is an 
infelicity that undermines its function. Since we are thinking of groups organized for action, the 
point of an announcement relates to the group’s action potential. Given this, the most general 
point is to commit the group to act in accordance with the content of the announcement. This 
need not involve any particular action (unless the announcement is that the group will do 
something), but it implies that in any matter on which it bears, the decision making of the 
group and the actions that it undertakes as a result will take what was announced as if it is true. 
 
This is not the same thing as saying that the group members believe what was announced. In 
the cases closest to collectivized individual speech acts, this may be what it comes to.  But in 
general a group can be committed to constraints on action through a decision procedure that 
doesn’t require that everyone in the group believe individually what the group represents as its 
official position. In this respect group speech acts that employ the device of a spokesperson, 
 
16 A referee suggested that we might make a further division within the category of group proxy speech acts 
between those that are proxies for collectivizing speech acts and those that are intended to represent a group as a 
group.  The idea is that, for example, when someone says “Everyone says ‘hello’,” speaking to someone on the 
phone for others in the room on his end, it is to be taken as having the force of each of them saying ‘hello’.  The 
suggestion is that this may be the model for class action lawsuits as well.  I think this is not quite right in the latter 
case.  In class action lawsuits members of a group are represented by a representative member or group 
(represented in turn by their attorneys).  But the class being thus represented will typically extend to similarly 
situation individuals whether or not they are even aware of the suit, at least in jurisdictions (like the United States) 
in which you have to actively opt-out not to be represented.  Thus, there is no question of the group authorizing a 
representative.  The sense in which the representative speaks in their behalf is that the representative speaks in 
the interests of members of the class.  It is rather like a court appointing a legal guardian for someone.  That legal 
guardian represents her principal’s interests, but was not appointed by him.  This legal device enables the 
representative trial to have legal significance for all members of the class, the defendant being required if the suit 
is successful to compensate every member of the class.  The case of “Everyone says ‘hello’” is interesting.  This 
seems to differ from a case in which someone says: “Hello on behalf of all of us.”  If I say on the phone to 
someone, “Jim says ‘hello’,” after Jim asks me to say ‘hello’ for him, I am proxying for Jim, representing him as 
saying ‘hello’.  The role is occupied on an ad hoc basis.  If Jim and Jill both ask me to say hello, I can say “Jim and Jill 
say ‘hello’,” and this is the same as saying “Jim says ‘hello’ and Jill says ‘hello’.”  But then this is not representing 
them as saying ‘hello’ together but only each individually.  And then if I say “Everyone (here) says ‘hello’,” in the 
same spirit, I am saying, “for each x (here), x says ‘hello’,” and this represents each as individually saying hello.  So 
this case turns out not to be a case of a group speech act at all, though it is an interesting case of someone acting 
as an individual proxy for every member of a group through a single speech act.   
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when a group can be said to have an official position, diverge from collectivized speech acts, in 
which all the members share the attitude that is the sincerity condition for the act. For 
example, a book club may determine an official position about where it is best to meet by a 
majority vote and announce it. Those in the minority do not believe that that is the best course 
for the group but accept it as the official position. Moreover, the discursive dilemma (List and 
Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 2001) shows that judgment aggregation can lead to an official position 
which is not accepted individually by any member of a group. Suppose that members of the 
book club decide that they want to meet at a central location that is quiet and comfortable. A 
proposal is made to meet at a café on South Main Street. The members of the club vote 
independently on each of the criteria. It emerges that there are three voting blocks of one third 
of the members each. Block 1 think the café is central and comfortable but not quiet. Block 2 
thinks the café is comfortable and quiet but not central. Block 3 thinks the café is quiet and 
central but not comfortable. The voting is displayed in table 1.   
 
 Central Comfortable Quiet Suitable Site? 
Block 1 Yes Yes No No 
Block 2 No Yes Yes No 
Block 3 Yes No Yes No 
Book Club Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 1: Discursive Dilemma. Each block of voters thinks one of the criteria for meeting at the 
café fails to be met, but a majority holds that each criterion has been met. As a result, the club 
accepts that the café is a good meeting place though none of its members think it is. 
 
This shows that there is a two-thirds majority in favor of the café meeting the club’s 
requirements on each of the relevant criteria. If the club has agreed to their decision being 
determined by a majority vote on each of the criteria, then the club’s official position is that the 
café meets its desiderata for a meeting place. But there is no one in the club who thinks that it 
does. Thus, the function of group proxy announcement is not in general to indicate that the 
members of the group believe what is announced. It is to indicate that the group will act in 
accord with it. As an official position, it will figure in official decisions about what to do, that is, 
decisions by the group acting as the group that makes the announcement.17  
 
This gives the point. The spokesperson is a mechanism for achieving it. The group’s goal is to 
express to an appropriate audience an official position. It has to be a public act that makes a 
content available to the audience. It presupposes an audience interested in what it wants to 
express. The means of expressing the content must be recognized by the audience interested in 
what the group wants to express as having that purpose for it to succeed. The announcing 
 
17 Not too much weight should be put on ‘official’. Even mobs may have a spokesperson. The Paris Mob appointed 
a spokesperson to negotiate with the Bastille’s governor Bernard de Launay. Still, in so appointing a spokesperson, 
the members of the Paris Mob were intending to commit themselves to acting in accordance with what they 
thereby announced as their official position.  
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group and its audience have a coordination problem. It makes sense to use the preexisting 
institution of language as a means of formulating the content. How does the group signify a 
particular verbal expression of the relevant content as the right one? While a group could 
arrange with its target community to have each member of the communicating group take 
turns reading a message one word at a time, this is obviously inefficient. This is where the 
device of the spokesperson come in. We can make use of one person (often, though not 
necessarily, a member of the group) who has the capacity of speech, to produce an utterance in 
a language, already meaningful given its conventions, which encodes the message that the 
group intends to convey. All that is required is that the announcing group and its audience 
coordinate on the same mechanism. They do so by adopting an intergroup convention about 
how to carry out the relevant social transaction. The intergroup convention is that the 
announcing group choose, that is, authorize, someone to convey the message in appropriate 
circumstances in a way that marks her utterance of a sentence expressing the message as her 
acting in her authorized role in the transaction. The utterance act itself then plays the role of 
making public the message in accord with which the group is committing itself to acting. It thus 
has a status function as a representation of the announcing group’s official position. In the 
product sense, the spokesperson’s utterance is the group announcement, though it is in fact 
the culmination of what the group does, which includes appointing a spokesperson and 
formulating a message. In this respect, it is like having someone with a power of attorney sign 
in my place in closing on the sale of a house. I count as closing on the date on which my proxy 
acts. It is my agency that is expressed in virtue of my authorizing someone to sign for me.  It is I 
who close on the sale of the house.  The idea is simple and brilliant, efficient and flexible, for all 
that it involves a lot of conceptual complexity beneath the surface. Figure 2 summarizes the 
picture. 
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The picture then is this: there is a type of social interaction between a group and an audience 
which involves the group’s making known to the audience its commitment to conform its 
actions in accordance with a certain content. This is the general concept of a group 
announcement. This specifies a function for something the group brings about without 
specifying what is to serve the function beyond that it has a certain content. There are many 
different things that could serve. Thus the audience and group face a coordination problem. 
The device of the spokesperson is one of the possible solutions to the coordination problem. It 
relies on an independent device, that of a proxy agent, someone who, acting under 
authorization and in virtue of that, does something that is to count as having a certain function 
in a social transaction, and thereby represents the group. In this case, the thing done is the 
performance of an utterance act (or series of utterance acts) by the spokesperson acting in her 
Figure 2: The Mechanism of Group Proxy Speech Acts. The spokesperson occupies a status role, a 
special type of status function. The function of the spokesperson is to make public a message 
formulated by her principal for an audience in on the arrangement. Appointment to the role is 
what constitutes authorization. The spokesperson’s utterance acts in that role count as group 
announcements, that is, have the status function of representing the group’s official positions. 
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role with appropriate contents. The audience has its role to play as well, both in the intergroup 
convention, and in the relevant transactions, for it has to attend to who has been assigned the 
relevant role and to her acts in her capacity as spokesperson. 
 
5. Complications, Objections, further Issues 
 
5.1 Whose agency in the group is involved? 
 
One complication is the question of whose agency is involved in the case of a group proxy 
announcement.  This is an issue that comes up more generally for proxy agents. In the simplest 
case the group implements a decision procedure for the assignment of the spokesperson and 
the content of the message that draws on contributions from everyone in the group. In this 
case, transparently, they are all agents of the group speech act, with the spokesperson playing 
at least two roles if she is a member of the group. However, there are at least two 
complications that come up. First, once the device of proxy agency is in play, we can assign 
proxy agents the power to assign other proxy agents. A group can be a proxy agent as well, and 
so we can assign to a group the power to decide on proxy agents for various purposes. Thus, it 
may not be the whole group that actually authorizes someone as spokesperson.18 The same 
thing goes for the message, for that may be delegated as well, as decision making in general 
may be, to proxy agents who develop official policy for a group. The second complication arises 
from the fact that institutions in particular are designed for perpetual existence by allowing 
successive individuals to fill the roles in them. Thus, those joining later after the structure of 
roles is set up do not look as if they play any role in the authorization of any proxy agents. 
 
The first of these does not present a problem for seeing all members of the group as agents of 
the acts it carries out through its proxy agents. For insofar as one is an agent of the 
authorization of another or a group to authorize others, one is also an agent of what they do 
that requires they act under their authorization. In this way agency is spread through chains of 
authorizations. 
 
The second of the issues shows that not everyone in a group which acts through proxy agents 
needs to participate in the official procedures for authorization even at a remove. But 
interestingly, it does not show that those joining an on-going institution are not still agents of 
what the group does through its proxy agents or that they are not, in a sense, authorizers of 
them. What do I mean? Joining an institution is something you do. You accept, e.g., a job, or a 
position, even if it is a lowly one. There is an institution at all only in virtue of the acceptance by 
its members of their roles in it. When you accept a role in an institution, you sign onto being a 
member with its various role assignments, whether you know what they all are or not. This is a 
tacit acceptance of the role of various proxy agents in the group as representatives of the 
 
18 In some cases, role assignment may fall to another group. For example, the power of assigning the role of US 
Supreme Court Justice does not reside with the Supreme Court but with the President who nominates and Senate 
which confirms. A similar arrangement could be made with any role including a spokesperson for an organization. 
The agency of the group is still involved in formulating the message that is to be conveyed, and even, though 
indirectly, in the authorization, by endorsing the mechanism which gives the choice to some other agency. 
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group, which includes you. Thus, it constitutes your authorization or at least acceptance of 
them as representing you as a member of the group. You thus participate in a sense in the co-
authorization of the various proxy agents in the group with all other members of the group, 
even if you don’t participate directly in either the original assignments and design of roles or in 
the official procedures within the institution for assignments. Thus, you are still, though more 
remotely, a constitutive agent of what proxies do in the name of their organizations.19 
 
5.2 An Objection to Collective Acceptance 
 
Lackey (2017) has objected to an earlier sketch of mine of the role of the spokesperson (Ludwig, 
2014) on two grounds. First, a sexist audience might simply ignore the duly appointed 
spokesperson for a police department because she is a woman. But it doesn’t follow that she is 
not a spokesperson. But on my account, for someone to have the status role of being a 
spokesperson, the announcing group and their target audience must collectively accept the 
arrangements. Second, the sexist members of a police department might not accept someone 
as the department’s spokesperson either. Thus, neither group nor audience need accept the 
spokesperson as spokesperson for the person to have the role. 
 
A police department is an institution embedded in a network of legal institutions sustained by 
large scale collective activity. The institutional structure is defined by an interlocking set of 
status roles. One of these is assigned the power of appointing the spokesperson for the police 
department. Let us say that it is the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police is in turn appointed 
typically by an agency other than the officers serving under her. The Chief of Police derives her 
authority from the institutional structures in which the police department is embedded. Thus, 
the collective acceptance that sustains the police department includes more than those who 
 
19 A referee asks whether this attenuated sense in which members of an organization are agents of what its proxy 
agents do is of any significance, particularly with respect to issues of responsibility.  Issues of responsibility are 
complicated anyway.  When there are chains of proxy agents between the initial authorizers and what a proxy 
agent does down the line, the question whether the authorizers of the original proxy agent are responsible in part 
for what one does at the end of the chain will depend largely on whether they were responsible in executing due 
diligence in the original appointment, in specifying policy (to the extent they are responsible for it), and in carry 
out their oversight responsibilities.  Nothing follows directly about what they are responsible for from their being 
formal authorizing agents of what proxies at the end of a long chain do.  Nor does not being a formal authorizer, 
directly or indirectly, of what proxy agents do entail that you do not bear responsibility for what they do.  Even if 
you does not have the role of appointing proxies, you may have oversight responsibilities for them in your role in 
an organization and fail to exercise them.  Apart from specific role responsibilities, what is the significance of your 
being a constitutive agent of what the group does through proxies in accepting a role in an institution?  It lies in its 
being what sanctions saying that the proxy acts for a group that includes you and that the proxy in acting 
represents you also.  Given that, it does have some implications for the responsibilities of members of 
organizations, for the proxy acts in your name too.  What those responsibilities are will be conditioned by a lot of 
other factors, your knowledge of the structure of the organization and what proxies are doing, whether they are 
acting within their role responsibilities or outside them, your role in the organization, your ability to detach 
yourself from it without undue cost, and your ability to work for effective change within the organization.  But, 
morally, what you cannot be is indifferent to having signed onto the proxies of the organization acting in your 
name as a member of the group.  Even if you played no role in appointing them to their roles, you have authorized 
them as representing you qua member of the group.    
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are members of it. Now, what of the attitude of the members of a particular audience and of 
the members of the police department (aside from the Chief)? Take the members of the 
department first. Do they believe that the Chief of Police does not have the authority to 
appoint a spokesperson? Presumably this is not correct. They may resent the appointment, but 
since it is legally binding, they would have to be seriously confused not to recognize that. Thus, 
their resentment is likely to be expressed in a lack of cooperation with the spokesperson while 
recognizing that she has that role.  In this, they fail to fulfill their role responsibilities, and so fail 
to have conditional we-intentions appropriate for their own roles.  But the group that sustains 
the arrangement by its collective acceptance of them includes many more than those members 
of the police department who fail their role responsibilities.  And this is what they recognize in 
recognizing that she has the role of spokesperson while they refuse to cooperate with her.  The 
same thing goes for the sexist audience. They can’t very well fail to recognize who has the role. 
But they may fail to cooperate with the police department through the spokesperson out of 
prejudice and resentment. They too, as citizens, are failing to fulfill their role responsibilities. 
But this doesn’t undermine the status of the person as spokesperson because the community 
that sustains it is much larger than any particular local audience, and includes as potential 
consumers the rest of the legal system. What is required is that enough people in the relevant 
community in which the device is supposed to function have appropriate conditional we-
intentions with respect to the role to sustain its functioning. And in complex multi-level 
institutions the role of other institutional structures which are geared toward acceptance of 
institutional assignments in accordance with powers accorded roles in them is a powerful 
mechanism for sustaining the role assignment.20 
 
 
20 A referee asked whether we might still acknowledge her as spokesperson even if an overwhelming majority of 
the relevant groups extending to the whole legal system failed in their role responsibilities.  This would need to be 
fleshed out a bit more.  If everyone stops acting in their legally defined roles, police, judges, senators, employers, 
city workers, payroll clerks, citizens, etc., then there would not be a legal system anymore.  Government at all 
levels would dissolve.  Suppose instead that they all just refuse to acknowledge the police station’s spokesperson 
but that’s the only lapse.  But this is a little hard to imagine.  So let’s take a simpler case.  Suppose we have village 
sized community.  Then we can imagine that they have a rule that allows a woman to be appointed spokesperson 
for the village police and it happens, as it were, accidentally, and they are appalled.  Then everyone except the 
spokesperson including the Chief of Police just refuse to go along.  Then is she their spokesperson?  By rule yes, but 
de facto no, and this then becomes an instance in which the practice is not aligned with the previous adopted 
rules.  They adopt another spokesperson by common consent and he then speaks for the police.  In these 
circumstances she is not their spokesperson.  He is.  You could say she is spokesperson “by rule,” but that only 
means that if they were following their rule she would be.  Is there pressure from a different direction?  Suppose 
an illegal union adopts a spokesperson that is not recognized by the legal system.  Isn’t she still their 
spokesperson?  Yes: not all appointments of spokespersons for group have to be legally recognized positions.  
Suppose, however, the authorities refuse to meet with the group’s spokesperson.  Isn’t she still their 
spokesperson?  This is like someone offering to play chess and suggesting certain pieces as pawns, bishops, etc., 
(not a standard set that get so called because of their design function) and no one taking them up.  You can insist 
that these are chess pieces, but while they could be so used, in order to function in the intended roles someone 
has to be willing to play the game with you.  
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5.3 Spokesperson Autonomy 
 
In the simplest case of group speech by way of a spokesperson, the message is fully formulated 
and there is a sense in which the spokesperson serves simply as a mouthpiece for the group. 
But this underutilizes the powers of the spokesperson, who can be assigned to proxy for the 
group in explaining policies and proposals and in answering questions. In this case, the 
spokesperson’s words are not chosen by the group. Two distinct things go on. First, the 
spokesperson explains in her own words what the message to be conveyed is and answers 
questions based on her knowledge of the matters officially decided. In this case, what she says 
represents the group’s view, and we count the group speaking through the spokesperson. 
Second, the spokesperson may speak on her own behalf in her role as spokesperson. This 
occurs when she is interacting with her audience as a spokesperson but not representing the 
views of the group for which she is a spokesperson. Speaking in her role, she may respond to a 
question by saying that she doesn’t know the answer. But this is not to say that it is not settled 
by group policy. She may also call on reporters to ask questions. In this she acts for herself, in 
her role. It is not the institution that is calling on reporters. She may engage in personal banter 
with the audience, still in her role, but without what she says representing the official positions 
of the group. She may also speak in her own voice even in an official context (the press room) 
on personal matters, lifting the mantel of spokesperson for a brief moment. Thus, among the 
things she says, we will need to distinguish between those that represent the group’s official 
positions, things she say in her own voice pursuant to her role, and things she says 
independently of her role.  
 
When she speaks representing the group’s view, but choosing her own words, the question 
arises whether the groups says exactly what she says. And here we should distinguish the 
questions whether it says those things and whether it says them intentionally. With respect to 
the latter, focus on a small group without much structure first, who settled by consensus on 
policy and a spokesperson but give the spokesperson autonomy in explaining policy. Then it 
seems clear that they intend to convey their policies through the spokesperson, but don’t 
intend the specific words she uses. So if they count as saying the specific things her utterances 
mean, the do not say them intentionally. Do they say them at all? While they are agents of 
them, the word ‘say’ may be inappropriate, insofar as we thinking of saying that p as involving 
an intention to say that p, and extend this rule saying in group speech acts. What does the 
group say then? The practice is to use glosses on the content that capture what the group 
intends to convey. This then should extend to the case of larger organizations with more 
elaborate institutional structures. 
 
5.4 Does the Spokesperson Perform a Speech Act in Her Own Right? 
 
We say that a group announced a policy through a spokesperson, but also that a spokesperson 
announced something on behalf of the group. The first foregrounds what the group does, the 
second what the spokesperson does. But the qualifier ‘on behalf of the group’ is crucial. The 
prepositional phrase modifies the significance of the verb. She is not making an announcement 
in her own voice. She is not representing herself as believing what she says (it is not part of the 
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job) but rather representing herself as representing her principal’s position. If what is said is 
false, she is not blamed but rather the group. When we she say announced something on behalf 
of the group, we intend to pick out her performance in her role as spokesperson. Does she 
perform a speech act in her own right, then? Yes. It is precisely expressed by ‘announced that … 
on behalf of ___’. It is the performance of a locutionary act intentionally in her role as 
spokesperson for the group for the purpose of conveying the group’s commitment to its 
content, imposing on it thereby the status function of being a group announcement (in the 
product rather than process sense). This gives the sense in which she performs a speech act.  
But does she perform an illocutionary act as well?  Yes.  For she does not merely perform a 
locutionary act.  It is not like singing in the shower or practicing a speech.  It has a specifically 
linguistic point in a communicative exchange.  Insofar, she performs an illocutionary action as 
well, the point of which has just been described.  This is what we pick out when we say that she 
announced/ordered/promised/etc. something on behalf of the group.  
 
5.5 Delegating Policy Making and Message Formation 
 
A group can assign a subgroup (or a member) the role of formulating policy for the group—the 
policy maker, for short. What the policy maker decides determines the content of what the 
spokesperson conveys when it is to be made public. But other members of the group did not 
participate in formulating the policy, and they might not learn what it is until it is announced 
(internally or externally). We say that the group announces something in this case, but does it 
do so intentionally? The prima facie difficulty is that, in contrast to the case of a small group 
that formulates the message by a public procedure that everyone endorses, not everyone in 
the group intends that the group adopt the specific policy it does—though they may intend 
they adopt appropriate policies through the policy maker’s decisions. So there is a sense in 
which the group did not intend to announce that particular policy. On the other hand, in these 
cases the standard practice is to say that the group intentionally announced the policy. But how 
can that be? 
 
When we say that the group intentionally announced the policy, we are focusing on the 
intentions of those who formulate policy and the terms of it being made public. So when we say 
the group intentionally announced the policy, we are saying that it was the deliberate result of 
a sanctioned procedure for the organization done intentionally by those empowered to do so. 
So here we use ‘intend’ and ‘intentionally’ not the sense of a shared intention but more in what 
we might call the organizational sense (see (Ludwig, 2017)). As long as we are clear about the 
distinction, we can say that in the shared intention sense the group did not announce what it 
did intentionally, while in the organizational sense it did. Though even in the shared intention 
sense there is some description under which what was done was done intentionally, such as 
announce appropriate and appropriately formulated policies. 
 
5.6 Insincerity 
 
A group proxy speech act is insincere when the group is not committed (at the time of the 
announcement) to acting in accordance with the constraints on behavior conveyed by the 
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content and form of the speech act. The failure to act in accordance with it need not be 
manifested only in how it interacts with others. It can also be manifested in how decision 
making is carried out internally. Thus, in the case of tobacco companies publicly claiming that 
there are no causal links between smoking and cancer, while they behaved in the market place 
as if that were true, relevant decision making bodies in the companies did not act in accordance 
with that, because their believing the opposite played a role in their official decision making 
about how to act, how to obfuscate public debate, undermine studies showing a link, and to 
avoid being caught in a lie. 
 
Doesn’t this raise a puzzle? If an announcement is a status function imposed on an utterance 
act whose point is to commit the group to act in accordance with it, then if the group is not 
committed, it is not using the spokesperson with the relevant function. Yet, isn’t it still an 
announcement, although insincere? As in the case of individual speech acts, once the core idea 
is in place, it can be exploited to deceive people. In this case, one isn’t playing the game, but 
pretending to do so. We extend the term ‘announcement’ to acts which make as if to 
contribute to realizing the canonical act type because the divergence is by its nature is not 
directly observable. Then we distinguish between sincere and insincere announcements (etc.). 
We have an interest in holding individuals and groups to account for how they represent 
themselves. Therefore, the status function assigned to the utterance act is representing the 
group as committed, and to represent it as committed does not entail that it is. We then also 
introduce a notion of being committed in a speech act sense to doing something, which merely 
means representing oneself as being committed in the psychological sense through 
performance of a speech act whose sincerity condition requires that. Thus, it is consistent with 
the status function account that a group can make an insincere announcement. In doing so, it 
commits itself to abiding by what is says in one sense, while it in another sense it may not be 
committed to doing so. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Group speech acts divide into collective speech acts on the one hand and group proxy speech 
acts on the other. Collective speech acts include irreducibly collective speech acts like 
agreements as well as collectivized individual speech acts like applause. Collective speech acts 
involve direct contributions from all members of the group. Group proxy speech acts 
paradigmatically involve the device of a spokesperson whose utterance acts express the official 
position of a group or organization.   While this may also be a position that its members accept, 
it need not be, as the official position may be determined by a procedure that all at least tacitly 
accept as binding though it does not reflect the views of any members of the group. The 
spokesperson is a proxy agent, which is a particular kind of status role which involves 
representing a group in social transactions governed by constitutive rules. The specific role of 
the spokesperson is to represent groups in a way that is analogous to how individuals represent 
themselves in speech acts. The device requires the group using it and its consumers be in on 
the arrangements.  The spokesperson announces not in her own voice but on behalf of the 
group, as the group at the same time announces things through the spokesperson.  The result is 
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a distinctive category of group speech acts expressed using ordinary speech act verbs used in a 
group-organizational sense. 
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